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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(Rehabilitation Act), federal employees may bring claims 
against their employer for discrimination.1 Since 1978, the 
Act in its amended form has generously, yet often 
interpreted as confusingly, provided two separate provisions 
under which a claimant may bring a claim—section 501 and 
section 504.2 Section 501 "is aimed at preventing agencies of 
the federal government from discriminating against 
applicants and employees with disabilities,"3 whereas 
section 504 applies to programs conducted by private entities 
receiving federal financial assistance in addition to programs 
conducted by executive agencies.4 Both provisions, however, 
intend to prohibit discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities and increase the opportunities of disabled 
persons within society.5 Several United States Supreme 
Court cases address aspects of Rehabilitation Act claims, 
such as whether section 504 provides a private right of action 
for employment discrimination,6 the availability of damages 
under section 504,7 or whether a condition qualifies as a 
"handicap" under section 504.8 None of these cases, however, 
specifically address whether section 501 or section 504 is the 
more appropriate section for discrimination claims brought 
by federal employees. Federal circuit courts and several 
district courts, on the other hand, have varying opinions 
 
1 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2020)). 
2 Id. 
3 1 ADA: Emp. Rights § 2.01 (2020).  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (rejecting 
plaintiff's argument that section 504 does not create a private 
right of action for employment discrimination). 
7 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holding that punitive 
damages are not available in private suits under section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act since punitive damages could not be 
awarded in private suits brought under Title VI, which is the 
relevant regulation of remedies for claims brought under section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act).  
8 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), 
superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as recognized in Shiring v. 
Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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about which section is appropriate for a federal employee's 
disability discrimination claim and the requirements 
therein, with some declining to address the issue or allowing 
a case to proceed under one provision or the other without 
explanation as to why.9 
A solution is therefore needed to identify a best 
practice, and consequently, a more uniform system of 
applying the intent of the legislature to Rehabilitation Act 
claims. By identifying and memorializing such a solution, 
Rehabilitation Act claimants may select the appropriate 
section of the Act from the point of their initial filing, carry 
out the specific requirement of that section, have greater 
clarity in their expectation for relief, and aid in the 
conservation of judicial resources, while honoring the 
legislative intent of the Rehabilitation Act. 
To find and propose the most appropriate solution to 
this problem, this note will first review the background of the 
Rehabilitation Act and its relationship to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). Then, it will explain the provisions in 
question, including how section 501 and section 504 came 
into existence, their amendments, legislative intent, 
causation standards, and remedies, which will shed light on 
the importance of identifying the correct provision under 
which to file. Next, this note will offer an overview of the 
"provision camps" formed by various interpretations 
throughout the federal circuit courts. Finally, this note will 
present a best practice that naturally flows from a deeper 
understanding of the combined background, legislative 
intent, and historical usage of each provision. 
A. BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) 
What we know as the Rehabilitation Act today began 
in 1917 with the Smith-Hughes Act. This act created the 
Federal Board of Vocational Education to address vocational 
rehabilitation needs of veterans with disabilities.10 Over 
 
9 See infra Section III.  
10 Smith-Hughes Nat’l Vocational Educ. Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 
64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (1917); see also The history of vocational 
rehabilitation, VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, 
https://scvrd.net/history (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
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time, those services were expanded to civilians with 
disabilities and broadened in their types of assistance and 
services provided, with architectural, employment, and 
transportation barriers finally being eliminated to allow for 
equal access for people with disabilities by way of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11 
The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, "[a]n Act to 
replace the Vocational Rehabilitation Act"12 and predecessor 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),13 was 
enacted to establish the Rehabilitation Services 
Administration and authorize programs for the furnishing of 
vocational and rehabilitative services to “handicapped 
persons.”14 The Act, as passed in 1973, did not contain a 
specific provision for a private right of action under section 
501, and contained a more limited version of section 504.15 
However, the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and 
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978 added 
section 505(a)(1) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1)) and 
created a private cause of action under section 501, in 
addition to other important changes.16 The Senate Report for 
those amendments states that the purpose of the 
amendment was to provide "for individuals aggrieved on the 
basis of their handicap the same rights, procedures, and 
remedies provided individuals aggrieved on the basis of race, 
 
11  29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2020).  
12 Id. 
13 Am. with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (2020) 
(revising the Rehabilitation Act to explain that the newly added 
terms “drugs” and illegal use of drugs” were to be interpreted 
consistent with the principles of the Controlled Substances Act, 
21 U.S.C. §801, and excluded individuals currently engaged in 
illegal drug use from coverage). 
14 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).  
15 Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
16 1 ADA: Emp. Rights § 2.01 (citing Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196 
(3d Cir. 1995); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied sub. nom., Barth v. Duffy, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994) ("private 
cause of action added to Rehabilitation Act because 'Congress 
decided that stronger measures were needed on behalf of persons 
subjected to handicap discrimination by government agencies"); 
see infra Section II for a detailed discussion of other important 
amendments. 
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creed, color, or national origin."17 The Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1992 then changed the term “handicapped 
person” to “individual with a disability” and applied the 
standards of Title I of the ADA to determinations of 
employment discrimination under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.18 Finally, the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 aligned the meaning and interpretation of the 
definition of “disability” under section 504 with the ADA.19  
In regard to the protections granted under the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that “the ADA must be construed to be 
consistent with regulations issued to implement the 
Rehabilitation Act”20 and “grant at least as much protection 
as provided by the regulations implementing the 
Rehabilitation Act.”21 In practice, “cases addressing the ADA 
are generally relevant for purposes of resolving claims 
brought under the Rehabilitation Act.”22 Although the two 
acts have “two distinct causation standards,”23 the ADA is a 
direct descendant of the Rehabilitation Act—it tracks its 
concepts while updating its terminology. Thus, each act can 
inform the other in a case analysis.24  
B. RELEVANT PROVISIONS TO CLAIMS UNDER THE 
REHABILITATION ACT 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as 
amended, broadly guarantees that  
 
17 S. REP. NO. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 18 (1978); see also 124 
CONG. REC. S15,591 (Daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of 
Senator Cranston). 
18 Rehabilitation Act Amends. of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 
Stat. 4344 (1992). 
19 ADA Amends. Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008). 
20 Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 US. 624, 638 (1998). 
21 Id. at 632. 
22 Hale v. Johnson, 245 F.Supp.3d 979, 985 (E.D. Tenn. 2017) 
(citing Doe v. Salvation Army in U.S., 531 F.3d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
23 See Lewis v. Humbolt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 315 (6th 
Cir. 2012). 
24 See appendix to this note. 
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[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or 
his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or activity conducted by any 
Executive agency or by the United States 
Postal Service.25  
 
Section 501, alternatively, prohibits employment 
discrimination by federal departments and agencies, 
including the U.S. Postal Service and Postal Rate 
Commission, against individuals with disabilities and 
requires affirmative action in the hiring, placing, and 
advancing of individuals with disabilities in the federal 
sector.26 "Section 501's provision for affirmative action in 
addition to section 504's prohibition of discrimination 
against the disabled indicates that federal employers are 
charged with a greater duty to ensure the employment of 
disabled workers than are federal grantees or private 
employers."27 The similarity of intent paired with the 
provisions' intermingling tendencies, as described above, 
creates potential for confusion in an analysis of whether one 
provision is more proper than the other when filing a claim. 
Additionally, each provision has its own causation 
standard—section 504 explicitly states a "sole" causation 
standard whereas section 501 only implies a "but for" 
causation standard.28 Finally, the remedies available to an 
aggrieved employee differ depending on the chosen provision 
as well—section 501 relies on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 whereas section 504 relies on Title VI of the same act, 
and those titles have their own inherent differences to boot.29 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND AMENDMENTS 
The United States Supreme Court succinctly 
explained that the basic purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is 
 
25 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2020). 
26 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2020). 
27 Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1997). 
28 29 U.S.C §§ 701, 794 (2020).  
29 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2020); see infra Section II.B. 
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to "promote and expand employment opportunities for the 
handicapped."30 The original Rehabilitation Act—The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1972—contained only brief verbiage 
representing what would later become section 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and no verbiage of the later 
enacted section 504.31 President Nixon killed the original 
legislation, however, by way of pocket veto after letting it sit 
on his desk until the 92nd Congress was out of session.32  
When the bill was re-introduced in the House of 
Representatives on January 3, 1973, still no language 
correlating to the enacted section 504 existed. The "clean 
bill" was then referred to the House Committee on Education 
and Labor on January 29, 1973.33  Again, the "clean bill" 
contained the same language described above, without any 
language relating to the prohibition of discrimination toward 
handicapped persons by any program receiving federal 
financial assistance.34  
When the measure was laid on the table on March 8, 
1973, and S.7 passed in lieu, text had finally been added to 
state that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving federal financial assistance."35 This took  
the Rehabilitation Act from an action to provide protection 
 
30 Consol. Rail Corp., 465 U.S. at 634 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 701(8)). 
31 Rehabilitation Act of 1972: Hearings on H.R. 8395 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Pub. 
Welfare, 92nd Cong. 92 (1972). 
32 Rehabilitation Act of 1972 (H.R. 8395), 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1579 (Oct. 30, 1972). See also dsteffen, How regulation came 
to be: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, DAILY KOS (Dec. 12, 2010), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2010/12/12/928271/-. 
33 CONG. RSCH. SERV., Summary: H.R. 3064—93rd Congress 
(1973–1974), Introduced in House (01/29/1973), available at 
Congress.gov (digital text of H.R. 3064 is not available).  
34 The language remained the same when reported to the house 
with amendments on March 2, 1973.  CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
Summary: H.R. 17—93rd Congress (1973–1974), Reported to 
House with amendment(s) (03/02/1973), available at Congress.gov 
(the actual digital text of H.R. 17 is not available). 
35 CONG. RSCH. SERV., Summary: S.7—93rd Congress (1973–
1974), Introduced in Senate (01/04/1973), available at 
Congress.gov (digital text of S.7 is not available). 
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for both federal employees, by way of section 501, to an action 
that also provided for non-federal employees with disabilities 
who participate in or seek the benefits of a program or 
activity funded through the federal government.  The 
Committee Report accompanying S.7 provided explanation 
that the bill was intended to remain "vocationally oriented," 
while still providing for "individuals whose handicap is so 
severe, or because of circumstances, such as age, that they 
may never achieve employment."36 Additionally, this report 
recognized the need for a committee "which will initiate an 
affirmative action plan for and seek to insure [sic] that there 
is no discrimination in employment of handicapped 
individuals by and within the agencies of the Federal 
Government in hiring, placement, or advancement . . . and 
that the special needs of handicapped individuals are being 
met on the job,"37 which appears to be language that would 
later become section 501. However, very little documentation 
exists on the discussion of section 504's meaning or 
importance in Senate Report accompany S.7 or even when it 
was eventually enacted.38 The most detailed discussion 
comes from a congressional debate through Senator 
Humphrey's remarks: 
 
I am deeply gratified at the inclusion of these 
provisions which carry through the intent of 
original bills which I introduced, jointly with 
the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Percy), earlier 
this year, S. 3044 and S. 3458, to amend, 
respectively, Titles VI and VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, to guarantee the right of 
persons with a mental or physical handicap to 
participate in programs receiving Federal 
assistance, and to make discrimination in 
employment because of these handicaps, and 
in the absence of a bona fide occupational 
 
36 S. REP. NO. 93-48, at 19 (1973). 
37 Id. at 51. 
38 Id. at 53 (stating only that "The bill further proclaims a policy 
of nondiscrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped 
individuals with respect to participation in or access to any 
program which is in receipt of Federal financial assistance"); Id. 
at 80 (referring to the same simple language without 
explanation). 
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qualification, an unlawful employment 
practice. The time has come to firmly establish 
the right of these Americans to dignity and 
self-respect as equal and contributing 
members of society, and to end the virtual 
isolation of millions of children and adults 
from society.39 
 
 President Nixon again vetoed the Act on March 27, 
1973,40 describing it as one "which mask[s] bad legislation 
beneath alluring labels."41 The President justified his 
decision by explaining that although the bill might "further 
an important social cause," it "neglect[ed] to warn the public 
that the cumulative effect of a Congressional spending spree 
would be a massive assault upon the pocket books of millions 
of men and women in this country" along with other 
unintended consequences.42     
The Senate failed to override the veto, but after 
negotiations between the Committee on Education and 
Labor and the Administration, the Senate introduced S. 1875 
on March 29, 1973.43  By June 27, the full Committee made 
a unanimous vote to order S. 1875 to be favorably reported 
to the Senate.44 President Nixon finally signed the bill 
(eventually, H.R. 8070) into law on September 26, 1973, 
enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.45 
 
39 118 CONG. REC. 32,310 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
40 CONG. RSCH. SERV., Actions Overview: S.7—93rd Congress 
(1973–1974), available at Congress (veto exists in S. Doc. 93-10 
(03/27/1973).  
41 S. Doc. No. 93-10, at 1 (1973), available at 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/messages/NixonR/S7-
Sdoc-93-10.pdf.  
42 Id. at 1–2. 
43 S. REP. NO. 93-318, at 5 (1973) (Conf. Rep.). 
44 Id. at 6. 
45 CONG. RSCH. SERV., Actions Overview: H.R. 8070—93rd 
Congress (1973–1974), available at Congress.gov. See also DAILY 
KOS (Dec. 12, 2010) (explaining the delay in passage of the bill 
due to the initial failure of Congress to compromise on the 
elimination of independent-living funding provisions).  
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A. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AND REMEDIES  
Since its 1973 enactment, the Rehabilitation Act has 
been amended six times,46 but the most important 
amendments to this discussion are the 1978 and 1988 
amendments. Before these amendments, section 501 “merely 
required federal agencies to submit affirmative action 
plans,"47 and there was no explicit private right of action 
under section 501 or 504, although some courts held that 
there was an implied right of action.48  The 1978 
amendments provided a response to this confusion by adding 
a private right of action under section 501, an extension of 
section 504, and remedies for both under section 505. The 
same year, the then Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW)49 also promulgated regulations to implement 
section 504 after the District Court for the District of 
Columbia held that it was necessary to do so in Cherry v. 
 
46 SIDATH V. PANANGALA AND CAROL O'SHAUGHNESSY, CONGR. 
RSCH. SERV., RS22068, REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973: 109TH 
CONGRESS LEGISLATION AND FY2006 BUDGET REQUEST 1–2 (2005). 
47 Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 302–03 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
48 Smith v. United States Postal Serv., 742 F.2d 257, 259 (6th Cir. 
1984) (listing a "confusing series of cases" showing an implied 
right of action in some cases but not others). In Smith, the Sixth 
Circuit did not discuss whether Congress intended section 501 to 
be the exclusive remedy for federal employees, but it did find that 
the Supreme Court's rejection of the view that section 504 did not 
apply to discrimination left only the question of whether a federal 
employee suing under section 504 was required to meet the same 
exhaustion requirement as one suing under section 501; see also 
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1096–98 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(Goldberg, J. dissenting) (citing legislative history that "shows 
that the 1978 Congress had no quarrel with the near-unanimous 
judicial interpretation of section 504" that a private right of 
action had been created by section 504); see also Prewitt, 662 F.2d 
at 301. 
49 HEW is now the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and the Department of Education (ED). CYNTHIA 
BROUGHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECTION 504 OF THE 
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973: PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES IN PROGRAMS OR 
ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL ASSISTANCE, 2 (2010). 
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Mathews,50 an impetus that was assisted by lengthy 
demonstrations at the HEW offices.51  
When section 504 was originally enacted in 1973 
under the header, "Nondiscrimination under Federal 
Grants," it simply read,  
 
No otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual in the United States, as defined in 
section 7 (6), shall, solely by reason of his 
handicap, be excluded from the participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.52  
 
However, the 1978 amendments to section 504 
extended the heading to "Nondiscrimination under Federal 
grants and programs" and struck out the period at the end 
thereof, inserting "or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States 
Postal Service . . . ."53 In comments on the 1978 amendments, 
Senator Cranston, one of the principal authors of section 501, 
stated,  
 
I can say with some authority that it was 
enacted in large part, as a result of the belief, 
on the part of Congress, that it was the 
responsibility of the Federal Government to be 
an "equal opportunity employer." The 
legislative history of the section 501 illustrates 
that with respect to the employment of 
 
50 Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976) (action filed 
to compel the Secretary of HEW to promulgate regulations 
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). 
51National Council on Disability, "Rehabilitating Section 504" 
(Feb. 12, 2003), available at 
https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/Feb122003.  
52 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 
Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). 
53 Amends. to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 
92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (1978). 
RECONCILING REHABILITATION ACT                                   121 
 
handicapped individuals, Congress expected 
the Federal Government should be a leader.54  
 
Additionally, in a 1976 congressional hearing, 
Senator Williams stated that the reason Congress enacted 
section 501 was "to require that the Federal Government 
itself act as the model employer of the handicapped and take 
affirmative action to hire and promote the disabled."55  
B. REMEDIES AND RELIEF 
In response to the disagreement among courts 
regarding whether there was an implied right of action under 
section 501, the 1978 amendments specifically added section 
505 (a)(1) (codified as 29 USC 794a) to make Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) 
available to any complainant filing under section 501.56 
These amendments additionally inserted section 505(2), 
making Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 available "to 
any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any 
recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such 
assistance under section 504 of this Act."57 
In essence, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin and allows for civil 
actions by aggrieved employees or job applicants,58 which is 
triggered by final agency or EEOC action, or failure to act 
 
54 CONG. REC. S15591 (Sept. 20, 1978); see also Prewitt, 662 F.2d 
at 301. 
55 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 301 (citing Rehabilitation of the 
Handicapped Programs 1976: Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on the Handicapped of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1502 (1976), quoted in Linn, 
Uncle Sam Doesn't Want you: Entering the Federal Stronghold of 
Employment Discrimination Against Handicapped Individuals, 
27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1978). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2020) (providing for a civil action to be 
brought in the same manner as an action against a private 
employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). 
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within a set time period.59 Title VII also provides the 
administrative remedies process and exhaustion of those 
remedies requirement.60 Title VI of that act prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin 
under any program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance and connects to employment discrimination when 
“the primary objective of the financial assistance is the 
provision of employment or where employment 
discrimination causes discrimination in providing services 
under such programs.”61 Title VI lays out an administrative 
procedure that essentially causes the withholding of federal 
funds from recipients that discriminate.62 In other words, 
Title VI enforcement appears to provide “no relief to the 
individual victim of discrimination."63 
C. DEFINITION OF "PROGRAM OR ACTIVITY" 
By 1984, the terms "program" and "activity" (as in 
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance" seen in section 504) had not been defined by any 
amendments. However, based on the Supreme Court's 
 
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2020) (giving aggrieved persons the 
right to bring suit if the EEOC does not sue, after failing to secure 
voluntary compliance, but otherwise gives them only the right to 
intervene in the EEOC suit); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) 
(2020) (requiring suit to be brought within 90 days of notice of 
final agency or EEOC action and permitting suit after a lapse of 
180 days without final agency action). 
60 42 USC § 2000e-5 (2020). 




62 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 (2020). 
63 James Lockhart, Annotation, To What Extent are Federal 
Entities Subject to Suit Under § 504(a) of Rehabilitation Act (29 
U.S.C.A.§ 794(a)), Which Prohibits any Program or Activity 
Conducted by any Executive Agency or the Postal Service from 
Discriminating on Basis of Disability, 146 A.L.R. Fed. 319, *2 
(2020). 
(citing e.g., Mercadel v. Runyon, 6 A.D.D. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1994); 
Tuck v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., 7 F.3d 465, (6th 
Cir. 1993), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied (Nov. 19, 
1993)). 
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"narrow interpretation" of the phrase "program or activity" 
in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Public Law 
100-259 encouraged the addition of subsection (b) to section 
504 in 1988.64 Importantly, this amendment clarified the 
term "program or activity" and "program" to mean: 
 
all of the operations of– 
 (1)(A) a department, agency, special 
purpose, district, or other instrumentality of a 
State or of a local government; or 
 (B) the entity of such State or local 
government that distributes such assistance 
and each such department or agency (and each 
other State or local government entity) to 
which the assistance is extended, in the case 
of assistance to a State or local government; 
 (2)(A) a college, university, or other 
postsecondary institution, or public system of 
higher education; or 
 (B) a local educational agency (as 
defined in section 198(a)(10) of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965), system 
of vocational education, or other school 
system; 
 (3)(A) an entire corporation, 
partnership, or other private organization, or 
an entire sole proprietorship– 
  (i) if assistance is extended to 
such corporation, partnership, private 
organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; 
or 
  (ii) which is principally engaged 
in the business of providing education, health 
care, housing, social services, or parks and 
recreation; or 
 (B) the entire plant or other 
comparable, geographically separate facility to 
which Federal financial assistance is 
extended, in the case of any other corporation, 
 
64 BROUGHER, supra note 49, at 3 (citing Grove City College v. 
Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) and Consol. Rail Corp., 465 U.S. 624 
(1984). 
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partnership, private organization, or sole 
proprietorship; or 
 (4) any other entity which is 
established by two or more of the entities 
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) . . . . 65 
 
Section 501, as first passed in the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, has experienced less change compared to section 
504. Although the original wording in the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1972 did not contain the wording meant to establish the 
Interagency Committee on Handicapped Employees with the 
"purpose and function" to "provide a focus for Federal and 
other employment of handicapped individuals" as the 
current section 501 provides, the general focus of the words 
that eventually developed into section 501 were always 
centered on a Federal purpose, with no mention of "State or 
local governments," either in 1972 or today,66 as the 1988 
amendment to section 504 provided.  
III. THE PROVISION CAMPS  
Regardless of whether the claimant brings a claim 
under section 501 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (or 
both), the claimant must show that (s)he was “otherwise 
qualified” for the position.67 However, the burden of proof 
differs depending on the chosen provision. Section 501 
requires only that the employee prove (s)he was 
 
65 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 
Stat. 28 (emphasis added). 
66 Compare Rehabilitation Act of 1972: Hearings on H.R. 8395 
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong. 2, 92 (1972) with Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2020)).  
67 29 U.S.C. §794 (2020) (covering “[n]o otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability . . .” in its protections); 29 U.S.C. § 
791 (2020) (referencing Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq., 
which defines “qualified individual” and prohibits any covered 
entity from discriminating against one). See Belasco v. 
Warrensville Heights City Sch. Dist., 634 F. App’x 507, 517 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (including “otherwise qualified” in the elements for a 
disability discrimination claim); Lai Ming Chui v. Donahoe, 580 
F. App’x 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2014) (including “otherwise qualified” 
in the elements of a failure to accommodate claim). 
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discriminated against because of her or his disability.68 
Section 504, on the other hand, requires the claimant to show 
that her or his disability was the sole reason for the 
discrimination.69 When courts stray from utilizing the 
section that appropriately applies to the cause-of-action-at-
hand, the standard the court relies upon may also be called 
into question.70   
The circuits are divided on whether section 501 and 
section 504 overlap with each other, allowing federal 
employees to sue under either or both, and whether one or 
the other should be the exclusive remedy.71 However, it is 
important to determine which section governs a federal 
employee’s cause of action because the chosen section 
determines the level of burden for proving elements of the 
claimant's prima facie case.72 By narrowing the focus to cases 
dealing with federal employee claims against a federal 
employer and separating the courts into "camps" based on 
the provision under which they allowed the claimant to bring 
her or his claim, followed by the application of legislative 
intent to the provisions, greater clarity may be had for 
determining the correct approach in situations that have 
been previously muddled or simply unaddressed. 
 
68 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2020). See Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists 
P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven if an employee 
establishes that their employer “regarded” them as disabled . . . 
the employee must still show that their employer discharged 
them (or took some other form of adverse employment action 
against them) because of, or “but-for,” their actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment”) (citing Lewis v. Humboldt 
Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 
69 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2020); Stanciel v. Donahoe, 570 F. App’x 578, 
581 (6th Cir. 2014) (“An employer makes a termination decision 
solely because of its employee’s disability when the employer has 
no reason left to rely on to justify its decision other than the 
employee’s disability.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
70 See infra Section IV. 
71 Lockhart, supra note 63.  
72 Id. 
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A. COURTS ALLOWING FEDERAL EMPLOYEE CLAIMS 
UNDER SECTION 504 
When the list of what defines a program or activity 
covered under section 504 is boiled down, section 504 covers 
three major classes of recipients of federal funds: (1) public 
school systems; (2) colleges and other institutions of higher 
learning; and (3) health, welfare and social service 
providers.73 Although this list does not explicitly include 
federal employees, some circuits have still recognized a 
private right of action for federal employees under section 
504, which is likely a confusion caused by the 1978 
amendments that added the words "or under any program or 
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United 
States Postal Service" to section 504.74 
In Taub v. Frank, for example, the First Circuit 
allowed a postal worker's claim to proceed under section 504, 
although it determined that Taub was ultimately not covered 
because he was not discharged "solely by reason of" his 
disability, drug addiction, but rather for distributing drugs, 
which is criminal and cannot be accommodated regardless of 
this fact.75 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit allowed an FBI 
agent's claim under both section 501 and 504 for an 
alcoholism disability, but focused on whether the claimant 
was "otherwise qualified"—a testament to section 504, and 
the regulations implementing section 504 that qualify an 
alcoholic or drug addict as a "handicapped individual"—
 
73 1 ADA: Emp. Rights § 2.01 (2020). 
74 See supra Section II. 
75 Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Roy v. 
Runyon, 954 F. Supp. 368 (D. Me. 1997) (entertaining a section 
504 suit without ruling on the issue of whether suit under this 
section is proper, leading district courts to conclude that suit 
under section 504 is proper, and assuming that the stricter "sole 
causation" provision applied whether the cause of action was 
under section 501 or section 504); Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 
(1st Cir. 1995) (deciding the case under 504 standards even 
though suit was brough under section 501, and noting that in 
Taub v. Frank, the appellate court had permitted suit under 
section 504); Sedor v. Frank, 42 F.3d 741 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting 
that section 504 applied to federal executive agencies and the 
Postal Service, but not specifically considering whether suit under 
section 504 or section 501 is more proper).  
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rather than investigating which section was proper for the 
claim.76 Ultimately, the court decided that Little failed to 
state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act in general.77  
Prewitt v. United States Postal Service is also a crucial 
case to this discussion, as it was the first case in a federal 
circuit since the 1978 amendments applied to the Act.78 The 
Fifth Circuit, having no comparison on how the 1978 
amendments applied in context, investigated the legislative 
history, and made the finding that 
 
[B]y its 1978 amendments to the 
Rehabilitation Act, Congress clearly 
recognized both in section 501 and in section 
504 that individuals now have a private cause 
of action to obtain relief for handicap 
discrimination on the part of the federal 
government and its agencies. The 
amendments to section 504 were simply the 
House's answer to the same problem that the 
Senate saw fit to resolve by strengthening 
section 501. The joint House-Senate 
conference committee could have chosen to 
eliminate the partial overlap between the two 
provisions, but instead the conference 
committee, and subsequently Congress as a 
whole, chose to pass both provisions, despite 
the overlap. "When there are two acts upon the 
same subject, the rule is to give effect to both 
if possible." By this same principle, in order to 
give effect to both the House and the Senate 
1978 amendments finally enacted, we must 
read the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies requirement of section 501 into the 
private remedy recognized by both section 501 
 
76 Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 
Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Because of the less 
than artful manner in which Congress amended the 
Rehabilitation Act, the statutory provisions produce an 
apparently incongruent enforcement scheme."). 
77 Id. at 259. 
78 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 292. 
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and section 504 for federal government 
handicap discrimination.79 
 
Like the Taub, Little, and Prewitt courts, the Sixth 
and Eighth Circuits also allowed claims by federal employees 
under section 501 or section 504. In Hall v. United States 
Postal Service, the Sixth Circuit referenced the Smith cases 
from 1984 and 1985 to hold that 
 
While it has not always been so, it is now clear, 
at least in this circuit, that federal employees, 
including Postal Service employees, alleging 
handicap discrimination in employment may 
maintain private causes of action against their 
employers under both sections 501 and 
sections 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.80 
 
That court viewed Hall's allegations of violations of 
section 504 of the Act and of the administrative regulations, 
which were adopted under section 501, to be a complaint 
applicable to both sections.81  
Finally, in Morgan v. United States Postal Service, the 
Eighth Circuit allowed a section 504 claim to be filed by a 
federal employee but insisted on exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, comparing the case that was before 
that court to other cases where exhaustion was not required 
when the defendant was not the federal government.82 The 
 
79 Id. at 304 (citing United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 
(1939)). But see Johnston, 875 F.2d 1415 (disagreeing with the 
Fifth Circuit's interpretation and holding that section 504 does 
not create a private cause of action against a federal employer by 
a federal employee). 
80 Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1077 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (relying on Smith v. United States Postal Serv., 766 
F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Smith, 742 F.2d at 
259–60. 
81 Id. 
82 Morgan v. United States Postal Serv., 798 F.2d 1162, 1165 (8th 
Cir. 1986); see also Oliver v. United States Army, 758 F. Supp. 
484 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (holding that the Army and Air Force 
Exchange Services is a federal employer because they were listed 
in EEOC regulations, making administrative remedies available 
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Eighth Circuit simply stated, "The difference appears to lie 
with the identity of the defendant."83 Although Morgan was 
decided several years before Johnston, the Eighth Circuit 
was starting to touch on important aspects of the 
amendments that provided explicit private rights of action 
and the reasons why section 501 and section 504 do not 
necessarily "overlap," as the Prewitt court had decided. 
Although it was only decided at the district court 
level, the court in Mackay v. U.S. Postal Service also provided 
an important opinion surrounding the remedies pertaining 
to section 501 and section 504 claims.84 The Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania noted that section 504 does not expressly 
require exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the 
express provisions of 505(a)(2) entitle a section 504 claimant 
to the remedies of Title VI, which also does not require 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.85 The critical issue, 
in that case, was whether in a suit brought under section 
504, the private cause of action against the federal 
government is provided under section 505(a)(1) or 505(a)(2). 
This must be clarified, because if a section 504 claim was 
subject to 505(a)(1), which incorporates Title VII, or if a 
federal employee discrimination claim could only be brought 
under section 501, exhaustion of administrative remedies 
would be a prerequisite to court action.86 The district court 
found that although section 504 prohibits handicap 
discrimination by executive agencies or the Postal Services, 
section 505(a)(2) only furnishes a remedy to persons 
 
to them, yet expressly allowing suit under section 504 with 
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement); Cf. 
Johnston, 875 F.2d 1415 (explicitly holding that federal 
employees do not have a cause of action under section 504, but 
adding that even if the appellate court were to allow a section 504 
claim, it would read into it the same Title VII procedural 
requirements that applied under section 501). 
83 Id. (referencing Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: 
Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
867, 873 & n.48 (1984) (explaining that "plaintiffs suing the 
federal government may need to exhaust, whereas those suing a 
federally funded party need not exhaust")). 
84 See Mackay v. United States Postal Serv., 607 F. Supp. 271 
(E.D. Pa. 1985).  
85 Id. at 274. 
86 Id. 
130                                       8 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2021) 
 
aggrieved by the actions of a recipient of federal assistance 
or a federal provider of such assistance and does not 
specifically refer to a federal entity such as the Postal 
Service, which is neither a recipient nor a provider of federal 
assistance.87 Furthermore, that court noted that the 
omission of postal employees in relation to a Title VI remedy 
is "consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, 
where the Court held the district court had no jurisdiction 
over a federal employee's discrimination claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 because Title VII provides the exclusive 
remedy for claims of discrimination in federal 
employment."88 Ultimately, the district court found that the 
differences between section 505(a)(1), which supplies Title 
VII remedies, and section 505(a)(2), which supplies Title VI 
remedies to a limited group not specifically including Postal 
Service employees, demonstrates that Postal Service 
employees as well as other federal employees must use the 
"exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme of 
Title VII to remedy public job-related handicap 
discrimination."89  
This selection of cases shows that when courts were 
faced with needing to interpret sections 501 and 504 and 
their requisite remedies as they apply to federal employees, 
Title VII remedies seemed to be a more logical solution. This 
conclusion therefore points to section 501 as the more 
appropriate provision for federal employee discrimination 
claims. 
B. COURTS DISALLOWING CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 504 
Courts that disallowed a claim under section 504 
seem to have generally done so when the defendant was not 
considered a federal entity, a receiver of federal funds, or 
when it did not fit the definition of "program or activity." In 
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
for example, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected 
the argument that a television station's license should be 
denied on the ground that it had not complied with section 
 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (citing Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 
820, 832–33 (1976)). 
89 Id. (citing Brown, 425 U.S. at 829). 
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504 and found that the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) was not required to comply with section 
504 in its licensing activities.90 The Court found that section 
504 was not intended to impose new enforcement obligations 
on the FCC, which was not a funding agency, and stated that, 
absent some specific direction in the Rehabilitation Act, the 
Court was unwilling to conclude that a public television 
station owed a duty to comply with section 504 and that the 
FCC had a duty to evaluate a public television station's 
service to the handicapped community by a stricter standard 
than that applicable to commercial stations in determining 
whether to renew a public station's license.91  
The Southern District of New York in DePompo v. 
West Point Military Academy, like the court in Mackay, held 
that since section 505(a)(2) made section 504 enforceable 
through Title VI remedies, which were intended to police 
federally funded programs, it presumably was intended to 
reach the federal government only as a direct provider of 
services or a funder of other providers.92 Another district 
court, the Eastern District of Virginia, held that an 
insurance company was not a recipient of federal financial 
assistance, and therefore, was not subject to suit under 
section 504.93 Additionally, in Williams v. Meese, the Tenth 
Circuit held that a federal prison inmate, who claimed he 
had been denied certain prison job assignments based on his 
handicap, failed to state a claim under section 504 of the 
 
90 Cmty. Televisions of S. Cal. v. Gotfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983); see 
also Cal. Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 840 F. 
2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 848 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (holding that commercial broadcasters who did not receive 
federal financial assistance were not subject to section 504 and 
this conclusion was unaffected by the 1978 amendment extending 
the reach of 504 by adding the clause "any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency," as this phrase referred to 
the FCC"s own activities and not those of the entities licensed or 
certified by the FCC). 
91 Id. 
92 DiPompo v. W. Point Military Acad., 708 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989). 
93 Dodd v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, 835 F. Supp. 888 
(E.D. Va. 1993).  
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Rehabilitation Act, since the Bureau of Prisons did not fit the 
definition of "program or activity" governed by section 504.94   
These cases show that section 504 is not appropriate 
for entities not directly receiving federal funds, and more 
importantly, that courts faced with these claims did not 
consider section 501 as an option. These outcomes further 
highlight section 501's exclusivity for federal employees 
alone. 
C. COURTS ALLOWING CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 501 
ONLY 
Some courts have recognized a private right of action 
for federal employee disability discrimination claims under 
section 501 only, discounting section 504 as an option. In 
McGuinness v. United States Postal Service, for example, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the claimant failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies and the outcome of his case would 
have been the same even if he filed under section 504 because 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required either 
way.95 That court noted that "it would make no sense for 
Congress to provide (and in the very same section–505(a)) 
different sets of remedies, having different exhaustion 
requirements, for the same wrong committed by the same 
employer; and there is no indication that Congress wanted to 
do this—as of course it could do regardless of what might 
seem sensible to us—when it added section 505 in 1978."96 
The court in Johnston v. Horne, held that "no private 
cause of action exists for a federal employee against a federal 
employer under § 794."97 That case dealt with the accusation 
of a forced medical retirement from a shipyard claimant 
filing under both sections 501 and 504. The Ninth Circuit 
explained that section 504 does not create a private cause of 
action against a federal employer by a federal employee, 
while acknowledging the circuit split of opinions and stating, 
 
94 Williams v. Meese, 926 F. 2d 994 (10th Cir. 1993) (failing to 
consider whether the Bureau of Prisons was separately subject to 
Section 504 as an executive agency).  
95 See McGuinness v. United States Postal Serv., 744 F.2d 1318 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
96 Id. at 1321. 
97 Johnston, 875 F.2d at 1418 (utilizing the codified version (§ 
794) of the Rehabilitation Act's section 504).  
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"It is unlikely that Congress, having specifically addressed 
employment of the handicapped by federal agencies (as 
distinct from employment by recipients, themselves 
nonfederal, or federal money) in section 501, would have 
done so again a few sections later in section 504."98 The D.C. 
Circuit also "strongly" suggested that federal employees 
proceed with discrimination claims under section 501, rather 
than section 504, recognizing that the statutes are 
duplicative and some courts have limited claims against the 
government as the employer to actions brought under section 
501, while others have allowed litigants to proceed under 
either provision.99 
These opinions plainly and decisively provide logical 
explanations of the 1978 amendments and how those 
amendments apply to federal employee claims while 
respecting the legislative intent of sections 501 and 504. 
D. COURTS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRING EXHAUSTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SECTION 504 SUITS 
In Smith v. United States Postal Service, the claimant 
attempted to argue that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies 
because section 504 actions are to be governed by Title VI 
rather than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an 
argument “based upon imaginative reading of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago.”100 He 
argued that “since the Supreme Court recognized in Cannon 
 
98 Id. at 1420 (quoting Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 
F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1985); McGuiness, 744 F.2d at 1321). See 
also Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (10th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989) (agreeing with the 
Ninth Circuit that "section 501 is the exclusive remedy for 
discrimination in employment discrimination on the basis of 
handicap and that section 501, not section 504, provides for a 
private cause of action for federal employees). 
99 Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub 
nom., Barth v. Duffy, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994); see also Milbert v. 
Koop, 265 U.S. App. D.C. 206 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (collecting cases 
describing the split and showing cases that expressly found suit is 
proper only under section 501).   
100 Smith, 742 F.2d at 260 (referencing Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)). 
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the kinship between Titles IX and VI held that a private 
right of action could be maintained in advance of exhaustion 
under the former by analogy to the latter, and since Title VI 
is closely tied to Section 504 through Section 505(a)(2) of the 
Rehabilitation Act, it follows that exhaustion is not required 
under Section 504.”101 The Sixth Circuit rejected this 
argument stating,  
 
[T]here are significant differences between 
this employment discrimination action 
brought by a Postal Service employee against 
his federal employer under a statute which 
provides him with extensive administrative 
procedures to remedy the alleged wrong, and 
the situation in Cannon, which involved a sex 
discrimination action brought by a rejected 
applicant to a private medical school under a 
statute which provided no such recourse.102  
 
The Sixth Circuit went on in Smith to investigate the 
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and its 1978 
amendments, applying the principal set forth in Patsy v. 
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), that explained, “in 
determining whether exhaustion is required, court[s] should 
first examine legislative intent.”103 When examining the 
legislative intent of the 1978 amendments, the Sixth Circuit 
highlighted that  
 
In amending the statute to incorporate 
expressly the "remedies, procedures, and 
rights" set forth in Title VII to redress 
handicap discrimination by federal agency 
employers, it is evident that Congress 
intended to invoke the legal principles applied 
in Title VII actions based on allegations of 
race, sex and national origin discrimination in 




103 Id. at 261. 
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claimant exhaust administrative remedies 
before filing suit in federal court.104  
 
Additionally, “[t]he exhaustion requirement is part of 
a longstanding congressional policy favoring resolution of 
claims of employment discrimination through 
administrative conciliation rather than a formal adversary 
process whenever possible.”105  
To further make its point, the Sixth Circuit relied on 
the Supreme Court case of Smith v. Robinson, where the 
claimant, a child with cerebral palsy, brought claims under 
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. §1983.106  In that case, 
the Supreme Court held exhaustion of administrative 
remedies under the EHA, which was established to clarify 
and enforce the educational rights of handicapped children, 
should not be circumvented by utilizing the “more general 
antidiscrimination provisions of Section 504.”107 Thus, the 
Sixth Circuit similarly held that the 1978 amendments to the 
Rehabilitation Act require exhaustion of administrative 
remedies whether the claim is brought under section 501 or 
section 504 because “Congress has not enacted one set of 
principles excusing exhaustion in handicap cases and 
another set of principles requiring exhaustion in sex, race, 
national origin, and age discrimination cases.”108 
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have also allowed 
federal employee discrimination claims under both sections 
but maintain that the Title VII exhaustion of administrative 
remedies requirement exists for both. In addition to Hall v. 
U.S. Postal Service, where the Sixth Circuit stated that 
federal employees may maintain a private cause of action 
against their employers under either section, but must 
exhaust administrative remedies,109 the Eleventh Circuit 
 
104 Id. (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982) (Title VII 
exhaustion requirement).  
105 Id. (citing e.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 
394 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1976).  
106 Id. (relying on Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)). 
107 Id. at 262. 
108 Id.  
109 Hall, 857 F.2d 1073; see also Smith, 742 F.2d at 262; 
Nighswander v. Henderson, 172 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955–56 (N.D. 
Ohio 2001). 
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considered a “handicap” discrimination claim by an employee 
of the Army Corps of Engineers under both section 501 and 
section 504. The Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to 
discuss whether such a claim was actionable under only one 
or the other,110 and held that whether the action is brought 
under section 501 or 504, the employee must satisfy the Title 
VII exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement.111 
Again, these types of holdings, which allow a claim by 
a federal employee under section 504, yet still require the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, points to section 501, 
which clearly requires exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, as the appropriate provision for federal employee 
claims.  
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF APPLYING THE APPROPRIATE 
CAUSATION STANDARD 
The standards of causation differ depending on the 
selected section for filing a federal employee disability 
discrimination claim—section 501 only requires a "but for" 
causation standard while section 504 requires a "sole" 
causation standard.112 Historically, courts have confused 
these standards, sometimes relying on the “sole” causation 
standard when the statute only required the “but-for” 
standard.113 The Sixth Circuit made the existence of this 
error evident in Lewis when it stated: 
 
 
110 Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that the 1978 amendments of the Rehabilitation Act 
extended the proscription of section 504 to activities of the federal 
government and created a private right of action under section 
501 in favor of persons subjected to “handicap” discrimination by 
federal employing agencies). 
111 Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that, 
like other circuits who have adopted this interpretation of 
Rehabilitation Act amendments, it was necessary to recognize 
that section 504 affords a private right of action to federal 
employees while imposing the section 501 and Title VII 
exhaustion requirement on federal employees bringing suit under 
section 504 in order to accommodate Congress’s intent). 
112 See supra Section IV. 
113 Lewis, 681 F.3d at 314.  
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For the past seventeen years, our court has 
required district courts to instruct juries that 
ADA claimants may win only if they show that 
their disability was the “sole” reason for any 
adverse employment action against them. The 
term crept into our ADA jurisprudence in 
Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 
843 (6th Cir. 1995), which involved claims 
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, a happenstance that may explain why 
we blurred the distinction between the laws in 
the first place . . . Our interpretation of the 
ADA not only is out of sync with the other 
circuits, but it also is wrong. Since Maddox, 
Congress has amended the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA several times, but the distinction 
between the causation standards used by the 
two laws persists.114   
 
The Sixth Circuit's discussion was focused on the 
importance of not importing the “sole” causation standard 
from section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to an ADA-only 
claim. However, it also spoke to the importance of not 
intermingling the “sole” causation standard of section 504 
with the “but-for” standard of section 501, especially given 
that section 501 has never been amended to include the 
words “solely by reason of” and because it directly references 
Title I of the ADA. 
For claims filed under section 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, courts have also held that a claimant 
must show that her or his disability was a “motivating” or 
“substantial factor” in the employer’s adverse action to meet 
the “but-for” or “because of” standard.115 Under section 504, 
on the other hand, a claimant must show that her or his 
disability was the sole reason for the employer’s adverse 
action.116 To explain the complexities involved in these 
 
114 Id. at 313–15. 
115 Id. at 317. 
116 Id. (“Courts must refrain from ‘apply[ing] rules applicable 
under one statute to a different statute without careful and 
critical examination,’ . . . an examination that in this instance 
reveals distinct causation tests.” (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)). 
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standards, the Lewis court pointed to Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, where the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the 
“because of” standard within “mixed-motive cases.”117 The 
Court decided that “if a Title VII plaintiff shows that 
discrimination was a ‘motivating’ or a ‘substantial’ factor in 
the employer’s action, the burden of persuasion should shift 
to the employer to show that it would have taken the same 
action regardless of that impermissible consideration.”118 
However, the Court in Gross refused to extend the 
“motivating factor” rationale (taken from Title VII 
amendments that were added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) 
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which 
“does not allow a plaintiff to prove discrimination merely by 
showing that her disability was a motivating factor behind 
her adverse employment action; the ADEA requires 
discrimination to be because of a disability, which means 
“but-for” causation.”119 The Lewis court held that Gross 
resolved its case, explaining, “No matter the shared goals 
and methods of two laws, it explains that we should not apply 
the substantive causation standards of one anti-
discrimination statute to other anti-discrimination statutes 
when Congress uses distinct language to describe the two 
standards.”120 This reasoning can be used to resolve 
discrepancies in causation standards under the 
Rehabilitation Act in the same manner.  
Therefore, logic dictates that in order to apply the 
correct substantive causation standard of section 501 claims 
and section 504 claims, it is necessary to utilize the 
appropriate provision for the claimants as indicated by both 
statutory direction and legislative intent. 
V. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR FEDERAL 
EMPLOYEES EXISTS ONLY UNDER SECTION 501 
The caselaw above, paired with the legislative history 
of the Rehabilitation Act, and courts' interpretations of that 
legislative history points to the result that a private right of 
 
117 Lewis, 681 F.3d at 317 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989)). 
118 Id. (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 171). 
119 Id. at 318 (citing Gross, 577 U.S. at 174, 177–78). 
120 Id. at 318–19.  
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action for federal employees bringing claims against federal 
employers exits only under section 501. 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY POINTS TO SECTION 501 AS 
THE EXCLUSIVE PROVISION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 
First, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, 
albeit scarce, provides justification for federal employees to 
exclusively rely on section 501 for claims against their 
federal employers. In Senator Humphrey's remarks 
pertaining to S.7, for example, the "virtual isolation of 
millions of children and adults from society," which he 
mentions in regard to the rights of handicapped persons' 
participation in programs receiving federal assistance,121 is 
unlikely to refer simply to federal employees, but rather 
refers to the general members of society that have been 
impacted by discrimination within these programs. This 
remark shows that the addition of section 504 was not meant 
as another means for federal employee protection from 
federal employers, but rather for others (i.e., private citizens) 
in addition to the protections that already existed in section 
501 for federal employees. 
Furthermore, the 1984 amendments defining 
"program or activity" contain the specific adjectives "State" 
and "local" placed before the word "government" throughout 
the new section, and there is no mention of the "federal" 
government therein. This emphasis of "State and local 
government," coupled with the mention of private 
organizations at subsection (3) in defining what section 504 
intended to cover, contrasts section 501's emphasis on the 
federal government. The Ninth Circuit was inclined to agree 
with this interpretation in Vinieratos v. U.S. Department of 
Air Force Through Aldridge.122 Although it did not 
specifically discuss section 504, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Title VII (the remedy provided in relation to section 501) is 
the exclusive channel for federal employee disability-based 
 
121 118 CONG. REC. 32,310 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
122 Vinieratos v. United States Dep’t. of Air Force ex. rel. Aldridge, 
939 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII is the 
exclusive channel for federal employee disability employment-
based discrimination claims to be heard in federal court, and 
failure to exhaust Title VII administrative remedies forecloses 
any claim to jurisdiction under the Rehabilitation Act). 
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discrimination claims to be heard in federal court, and 
failure to exhaust Title VII administrative remedies 
forecloses any claim to jurisdiction under the Rehabilitation 
Act.123  
Perhaps the most telling sign that section 501 was 
intended for federal employees while section 504 was 
intended for others is the method in which section 501 is 
enforced. In 1979, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) took over responsibility for section 501 
and was charged with "coordinating and enforcing all the 
equal employment opportunity programs throughout the 
federal government."124 The laws under EEOC’s authority 
are numerous and include sections 501 and 505 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, which makes discrimination against a 
qualified person with a disability in the federal government 
unlawful, and Title I of the ADA, which protects the rights of 
employees and job seekers against discrimination.125 
However, the EEOC does not enforce sections 503, 504, or 
508 of the Rehabilitation Act, which pertain to federal 
contractors, programs and activities receiving federal 
financial assistance, and the accessibility of electronic 
information used by the government for people with 
disabilities, respectively.126 The EEOC also does not enforce 
Title II of the ADA, which relates to the public programs, 
services, and activities that protect people with 
disabilities.127 Thus, in charging the EEOC with the 
authority to enforce federal laws prohibiting discrimination 
in the workforce, it is clear that the charge was not intended 
for implementation of sections not specifically intended for 
federal employees bringing claims against federal employers. 
Moreover, the Department of Labor (DOL) clearly 
differentiates between sections 501 and 504 by listing section 
501 as a prohibition of "federal agencies from discriminating 
against qualified individuals with disabilities in employment 
 
123 Id. 
124 1 ADA: Emp. Rights at 3. 
125 Laws Enforced by EEOC, EEOC.GOV, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/laws-enforced-eeoc (last visited 
July 10, 2020). 
126 Workplace Laws Not Enforced by the EEOC, EEOC.GOV, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/workplace-laws-not-enforced-eeoc (last 
visited July 10, 2020). 
127 Id. 
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[and] . . . take[s] affirmative action in hiring, placing and 
advancing individuals with disabilities," while listing section 
504 as a prohibition against "recipients of federal financial 
assistance from discriminating against qualified individuals 
with disabilities in employment and in their programs and 
activities."128 The DOL points out that it has a Civil Rights 
Center (CRC) to enforce section 504 as it relates to recipients 
of financial assistance,129 while pointing to the EEOC for 
requirements under section 501.130 Even more importantly, 
the DOL openly states, "Individuals do not have to exhaust 
administrative procedures under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act. They may file suit in federal district court 
against a private employer receiving federal financial 
assistance, without filing a complaint with the 
administrative agency."131  
Similarly, the National Council on Disability (NCD), 
the "independent federal agency charged with advising the 
President, Congress, and other federal agencies regarding 
policies, programs, practices, and procedures that affect 
people with disabilities"132 stated,  "Section 504 of the 1973 
Rehabilitation Act is acknowledged as the first national civil 
rights law to view the exclusion and segregation of people 
with disabilities as discrimination and to declare that the 
Federal Government would take a central role in reversing 
and eliminating discrimination."133 This statement points to 
the federal government's role in protecting disabled citizens, 
but does not point to federal employees when mentioning the 
 
128 DEP'T. OF LABOR, LAWS AND REGULATIONS, available at 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/disability/laws (last visited Nov. 
21, 2020). 
129 Id.; DEP'T. OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT, available at 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oasam/centers-offices/civil-rights-
center/about (last visited Nov. 21, 2020). 
130 Id. 
131 DEP'T. OF LABOR, OFFICE OF DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT POLICY, 
available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/odep/publications/fact-
sheets/employment-rights-who-has-them-and-who-enforces-them 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2020). 
132 National Council on Disability, "About Us," available at 
https://www.ncd.gov/about. 
133 National Council on Disability, "Rehabilitating Section 504" 
(Feb. 12, 2003), available at 
https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/Feb122003. 
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purpose of section 504, but rather to "people with 
disabilities" in general. With clear charges, such as those to 
the EEOC, and logical interpretations paired with overt 
public statements like those from the DOL and NCD, it is 
difficult to see how these sections could have ever become so 
intwined. 
B. CASELAW POINTS TO SECTION 501 AS THE 
EXCLUSIVE PROVISION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 
While some caselaw does not offer a thorough 
investigation of whether section 501 or section 504 is 
appropriate for a federal employee's disability discrimination 
claim, case law from courts that addressed the issue of 
whether a claimant appropriately brought a claim under 
section 501 or section 504 tends to point to the conclusion 
that federal employees should only bring their claim under 
section 501.  
For example, the Taub court was not required to 
address the question in detail since Taub was not discharged 
for a reason covered by the Rehabilitation Act at all.134 The 
Little court simply allowed the claimant to file under both 
sections while largely focusing on section 504 as a convenient 
way to discuss how Little may not have been "otherwise 
qualified" for his position.135 The Hall and Smith courts 
made similar holdings based on vague interpretations of the 
sections and allowed claims by federal employees under 
both.136 The Morgan court allowed a claim under section 504, 
yet still required the exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
a requirement of section 501, not section 504, since the 
defendant was the federal government.137 The Prewitt court, 
 
134 Taub, 957 F.2d. at 8. 
135 Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 
Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Because of the less 
than artful manner in which Congress amended the 
Rehabilitation Act, the statutory provisions produce an 
apparently incongruent enforcement scheme."). 
136 Hall, 857 F.2d at 1077; Smith, 766 F.2d at 206; Smith, 742 
F.2d at 259–60. 
137 Morgan, 798 F.2d at 1165 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Oliver, 758 
F. Supp. 484 (holding that the Army and Air Force Exchange 
Services is a federal employer because they were listed in EEOC 
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however, did delve into a legislative history discussion, 
coming to the conclusion that section 501 and section 504 
overlap each other and justified applying the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies requirement to both sections,138 
only to be disagreed with by the Tenth Circuit a few years 
later in Johnston, which stated that section 504 does not 
create a private cause of action against a federal employer by 
a federal employee.139  
Although not binding, several district court cases 
helped to shed light on the specific requirements of section 
501 and section 504, differentiating the separate purposes of 
the two sections. The Mackay court explained that section 
504, which specifically relies on section 505(a)(2) and Title 
VI for its remedies, and does not include the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies requirement, should be treated 
separately from section 501, which specifically relies on 
section 505(a)(1) and Title VII for its remedies (which does 
require the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
requirement).140 That court also relied on the Supreme Court 
decision from  Brown to hold that Title VII is the exclusive 
remedy for federal employees.141 Likewise, the DiPompo142 
and Dodd143 courts made similar differentiations between 
the two sections. Hence, claims by federal employees under 
the Rehabilitation Act should be filed under section 501. 
Courts that disallowed claims under section 504 also 
help to clarify why section 501 should be reserved for federal 
employees and section 504 for other entities receiving federal 
funds. For example, in finding that the FCC was not required 
 
regulations, making administrative remedies available to them, 
yet expressly allowing suit under section 504 with exhaustion of 
administrative remedies requirement); Cf. Johnston, 875 F.2d 
1415 (explicitly holding that federal employees do not have a 
cause of action under section 504, but adding that even if the 
appellate court were to allow a section 504 claim, it would read 
into it the same Title VII procedural requirements that applied 
under section 501). 
138 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 304. 
139 Johnston, 875 F.2d 1415. 
140 Mackay, 607 F. Supp. 271. 
141 Id. (citing Brown, 425 U.S at 832–33). 
142 DiPompo, 708 F. Supp. 540. 
143 Dodd, 835 F. Supp. 888.  
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to comply with section 504 in its licensing activities,144 the 
Supreme Court certainly did not suggest that claimants rely 
on section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act instead. These types 
of decisions further highlight the relation of section 501 
specifically to federal employees. 
Nonetheless, court decisions that explicitly allowed 
claims under section 501 offer the most useful clarification of 
section 501's purpose as compared to that of section 504. The 
Seventh Circuit came to the logical conclusion that it would 
be insensible for Congress to provide two different sets of 
remedies with different requirements within the same 
section for the same wrong committed by the same 
employer,145 which seems to be a more believable 
interpretation than the one provided in Prewitt, which 
tolerated the idea that Congress actively made a decision to 
pass overlapping provisions.146 The Ninth Circuit agreed 
with the Seventh Circuit's logic, addressing the unlikeliness 
of two closely-located sections of the same act addressing the 
same types of employment in regard to handicapped 
individuals.147 Finally, the D.C. Circuit followed suit by 
recommending section 501 as the proper provision for federal 
employment discrimination claims.148 Additionally, even 
when courts allowed suit by federal employees under section 
504, the majority required the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies,149 which speaks to the appropriateness of section 
501 instead of section 504 for these claims.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL FOR BEST PRACTICE 
Federal employees, such as employees of the Postal 
Service or legislative and judicial branches of the 
government, should file under section 501 of the 
 
144 Cmty. Televisions of S. Cal., 459 U.S. 498. 
145 McGuinness, 744 F.2d at 1318. 
146 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 304. 
147 Johnston, 875 F.2d at 1418. 
148 Barth, 2 F.2d 1180. 
149 Smith, 742 F.2d at 260 (distinguishing that case from Cannon, 
441 U.S. 677, a sex discrimination action) (relying on Smith, 468 
U.S. 992 (explaining that Section 504 should not be used to 
circumvent the exhaustion requirements under Section 501); see 
also Hall, 857 F.2d 1073; Nighswander, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 955–
56; Treadwell, 707 F.2d 473; Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455. 
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Rehabilitation Act when seeking redress for disability 
discrimination by their federal employer. The trends above 
show that even if a federal employee brings action under 
section 504, the courts are likely to hold that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is required, nonetheless. 
Additionally, section 504 technically does not allow for 
damages personal to the claimant, but rather seeks to 
withhold funding from the entity receiving federal funding 
as recourse for their discriminatory actions.150 Therefore, it 
may not financially benefit the claimant to bring her or his 
claim under section 504.  
Employees of private entities that receive federal 
financial assistance, such as public-school systems, colleges 
and other institutions of higher learning, and health, 
welfare, and social service providers, should conversely rely 
on section 504. The legislative intent of section 504 and the 
amendments that followed speak to the intention of Congress 
to allow for federal employees and non-federal employee 
individuals alike to be protected by disability discrimination, 
but under two separate sections of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Section 501 shows that the federal government is the leader 
in this effort and opens the door to section 504 to hold all 
entities receiving federal funds, not just the federal 
government itself, to a higher standard of inclusion for 
disabled individuals. 
Finally, applying a uniform standard of how 
claimants may file under the Rehabilitation Act based on 
their status as a federal employee allows for the appropriate 
causation standard to apply to the claimant’s case, making 
for a less convoluted analysis by the court and ultimately 
saving personal and judicial resources.   
  
 
150 However, most circuit and district courts have concluded that 
compensatory damages, such as pain and suffering, are available 
under section 504, mostly based on their reading of Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Public Schools, where the Court held that 
compensatory damages were available to a student who brought a 
claim of sexual harassment against a teacher under Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972. 1 ADA: Employee Rights § 
2.01. 







"but-for"/"because of" "soley by reason of"
Procedural References
Civil Rights Act, Title VII (requires exhaustion of 
administrative remedies)
Civil Rights Act, Title VI (aimed at withholding federal 
funds)
Remedies
Rehab Act, § 505(a)(1) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794a(1)) Rehab Act, § 505(a)(2) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2))
Violation Standards
ADA, Title I (prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities)
Provisions
Rehab. Act, § 501 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 791) - prohibits 
discrimination of disabled federal employees by Federal 
government 
Rehab. Act, § 504 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794) - prohibits 
discrimination of an otherwise qualified individual by 
recipients of federal finanical assistance who discriminate 
in their programs and activities
